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Borg-Warner may be viewed in a favorable light. It cannot be denied
that one of its welcome effects will be to reduce the scope of potential
industrial strife.
From the foregoing analysis, it does not necessarily follow that if the
instant case had been granted certiorari by the Supreme Court it would
have been overturned..2 4 The degree to which the area of mandatory col-
lective bargaining is to be narrowed or broadened, or influenced by
government regulation, probably will not be determined in cases such as
the instant case. A performance bond proposal possesses a unique place in
the history of labor-management relations, and its handling by the Board
and the courts is not necessarily indicative of a general attitude that will
prevail in the treatment of other different but related proposals. It will
take a proposal of more recent birth, newly arrived upon the bargaining
scene, unburdened by the weight of judicial and administrative precedent,
and related more intimately to the actual performance of work, to enable
one to estimate accurately the final impact of the Borg-Warner decision
upon the practice of collective bargaining.
Thomas F. Caffrey
LABOR LAW-JURISDICTION OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD-
PICKETING OF FOREIGN OWNED AND MANNED VESSELS IS "ARGU-
ABLY SUBJECT" TO JURISDICTION OF NLRB.
Incres S.S. Co., Ltd. v. Int'l Maritime Workers Union
(N.Y. 1961).
The Incres Steamship Company, Limited is a Liberian corporation
wholly owned by Italian shareholders. Incres operates two Liberian-
registered ships which are manned by foreign crews recruited abroad.
These vessels run regularly scheduled cruises to certain Caribbean ports,
the cruises originating at and returning to New York City. Incres has its
main office in London, and it shares another office in New York with
a subsidiary New York corporation which acts as its agent in booking
passengers for the cruises and providing for supplies and repairs. Agents
of the defendant union boarded Incres' two ships several times and spoke
with the crew members regarding unionization. Upon the breakdown of
negotiations on this subject between the union and Incres, the former
picketed one of Incres' ships while it was docked in New York,
charging Incres with unfairness in refusing to recognize the union and
demanding better wages for the crew members. Under the persuasion
24. Cert. denied, 82 S. Ct. 42, 30 U.S.L. Week 3112 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1961).
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of the union, one hundred members of the crew left the ship, making it
impossible for it to sail. Consequently, several cruises had to be cancelled.
The union filed charges of unfair labor practices against Incres with the
National Labor Relations Board which were still pending when Incres
brought suit in the New York Supreme Court asking that the picketing
be enjoined. The union challenged the court's jurisdiction to consider the
suit, contending that under San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,1
the conduct complained of was at least "arguably subject" to the juris-
diction of the National Labor Relations Board as protected activity or
as a prohibited unfair labor practice under § 7 or § 8 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act).2 It was contended,
therefore, that the court must yield to the exclusive primary jurisdiction
of the federal Board. The court, however, granted the injunction, holding
that defendant's acts were tortious and that the state court had juris-
diction to restrain them. The Appellate Division upheld the lower court,
with certain modifications, and cross-appeals were taken. The New York
Court of Appeals, with three judges dissenting, reversed, holding that a
dispute between an American labor union and a foreign corporation which
operates a 'flag-of-convenience' ship making regular stops at a United
States port is at least "arguably subject" to the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board, and, therefore, without the jurisdiction of
the federal or state courts. Incres S.S. Co., Ltd. v. Int'l Maritime Workers
Union, 219 N.Y.S.2d 21, 176 N.E.2d 719 (1961).
The first section of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(Taft-Hartley Act) states that the purpose and policy of the Act is to
promote the free flow of commerce and, in general, to provide orderly
procedures for the enforcement of the rights of both employers and em-
ployees. 4 In order that the rights set up by the Act might be effectively
and uniformly protected, the courts, both state and federal, have been
1. 359 U.S. 236, 79 S. Ct. 773 (1959).
2. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958): "Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection . . . "
61 Stat. 140-43 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958): "(a) It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer - (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title; (2) to dominate
or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization . . . ;(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization . . . ; (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title .
3. 11 App. Div. 2d 177, 202 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1960).
4. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) : "It is the purpose and policy of this
chapter, in order to promote the full flow of commerce, to provide orderly and
peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either [employer or employee]
with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual employees
and their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to
define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect
commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the
public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce."
2
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deprived of original jurisdiction to consider any suits arising from
activities which are "arguably" protected by § 7 or prohibited by § S
of the Act.5 It has been pointed out that the courts are not primary
tribunals to adjudicate whether a particular activity is governed by § 7 or
§ 8; it is essential to the integrity of national labor policy that these
determinations be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations
Board." Special problems arise, however, when these general principles of
jurisdictional determination are applied to situations involving disputes
between employers and employees engaged in United States foreign
commerce.
If a United States ship-owner hires men at wages below the union
scale, the picketing activities of the protesting union would clearly come
within the scope of the Labor Management Relations Act. The Act was
obviously aimed at relations between employers and employees who are
engaged in foreign commerce and both of whom are citizens of the United
States. However, the American seaman is equally affected if the employer
is an alien in name only, as is the case with domestic owners of 'flag-of-
convenience' ships. The beneficial owners of such foreign-registered
vessels might then successfully avoid the better wages and conditions which
a crew of American seamen would demand. On the other hand, if
the beneficial owners, as well as the corporate owners, are aliens, and the
ship operates primarily between foreign ports, principles of comity
among nations would certainly warrant an assumption that Congress
intended no interference here, even though it is clear that Congress
could dictate whatever rules it wished as a condition to entering United
States waters.7 The question of over what situations Congress intended to
confer jurisdiction upon the National Labor Relations Board becomes a
very difficult one, despite some judicial language to the contrary. 8 Further,
due to the sometimes conflicting reasoning of the courts it has become very
difficult to ascertain exactly what criterion is being employed to determine
the National Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction.
5. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S. Ct.
773 (1959). This case dealt with picketing by a union of a lumber business. The
employers, in refusing to accept an agreement to retain in their employ only those
workers who were members of the union, contended that the union had not been
designated by the employees as their collective bargaining agent. The employers
claimed that the sole purpose of the picketing was to compel execution of the
contract; the union contended that its aim was to persuade the workers to become
members. The United States Supreme Court reversed the state court's decision
awarding damages to the employer and held that, due to the potential conflict of
inconsistent standards on the state and federal level, whenever an activity is
"arguably subject" to § 7 or § 8 of the Labor Management Relations Act "the
States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the
N.L.R.B. if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted."
(at 245, 79 S. Ct. at 780) See also, Garner v. Teamsters Union, Local 776, 346 U.S.
485, 490-91, 74 S. Ct. 161, 165 (1953).
6. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, supra note 5, at 244-45, 74
S. Ct. at 179.
7. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 142, 77 S. Ct. 699,
701-02 (1957); See also, Wildenhus' Case, 120 U.S. 1, 7 S. Ct. 385 (1887).
8. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, supra note 7, at 143, 77 S. Ct. at 702.
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In the present case, the employer-steamship company relied upon
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo9 as supporting its contention that it is
not even "arguable" that Congress intended to extend the jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board to the dispute in question. In the
Benz case, the ship flew a foreign flag, was owned by a foreign corpora-
tion, and was manned by a foreign crew. The United States Supreme
Court declared that the damages awarded by the district court to the
shipowners for the loss incurred by reason of a United States union's
picketing of the ship while it was transiently in a United States' port should
be allowed. The Court noted:
Our study of the Act [the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947] leaves us convinced that Congress did not fashion it to
resolve labor disputes between nationals of other countries operating
ships under foreign laws. The whole background of the Act is
concerned with industrial strife between American employers and
employees.' 0
The Court further emphasized:
What was said [in Congress, upon adoption of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act] inescapably describes the boundaries of the
Act as including only the workingmen of our own country and its
possessions."'
There is little indication that the Court based its decision upon the narrow
point of the vessel's minimal contacts with American commerce, although
later cases have made much of this element. 12 In Marine Cooks &
Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co.,13 the Supreme Court again considered the
Benz case. The fact situation was similar to that in Benz, except that
no mention was made of the ship's being merely incidentally in American
waters. The Court held that the lower federal court was without juris-
diction to issue an injunction against the union's picketing because it
arose in connection with a "labor dispute" as defined by § 13 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.14  In distinguishing the Benz case, the Court
said:
9. Supra note 7.
10. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, supra note 7, at 143, 77 S. Ct. at 702.
11. Id. at 144, 77 S. Ct. at 703.
12. E.g., Navios Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 402 Pa. 325, 166 A.2d 625(1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 905, 81 S. Ct. 1047 (1961) ; Incres S.S. Co., Ltd.
v. International Maritime Workers Union, 219 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1961).
13. 362 U.S. 365, 80 S. Ct. 779 (1960).
14. 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1958): "The term 'labor dispute'
includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or con-
cerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee:" § 1 of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101(1958), states: "No court of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute..."
(VOL. 7
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Nothing was said or intimated in Benz which would justify an
inference that because a United States District Court has power to
award damages in state cases growing out of labor disputes it also has
power to issue injunctions in like situations. 15
The Court laid little stress upon the lack of regular contacts with the
United States.
The union, in the instant case, ignoring the broad language of Benz,
distinguished that case by emphasizing the regular course of business
which the Incres ships conducted from ports of the United States. The
union particularly stressed the West India Fruit case, 16 which was decided
by the National Labor Relations Board, and the Navios case. 17 The fact
that in the West India Fruit case the ship-owner was a Virginia corpora-
tion considerably weakens this case as authority for extending the National
Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction to a dispute involving a vessel owned
by a foreign corporation. However, the language of the Board in that
decision is very significant. The criterion set up to determine the Board's
jurisdiction was simply the effect of the dispute upon commerce :1
... this Board was created to advance the public interest in eliminating
obstructions to commerce, not to adjudicate private controversies.
Under such a statutory policy, it would be anomolous at best to base
jurisdiction upon the citizenship and residence of the parties involved,
rather than upon their relationship to the protected commerce of
this nation.1 9
The Board pointed out that:
... it is the effect .. upon foreign commerce, not the source of the
injury which is the criterion... 20
15. Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., supra note 13, at 369, 80
S. Ct. at 783. In this case, at 371, in footnote 12, the Court refers to another
interesting distinction between this case and Benz. The Court points out that in
Benz, the American union members did not belong to the union of the foreign crew
members, but were merely picketing in sympathy with them; while in the Panama
case, the unions were not interested in the internal economy of the ship, but in
preserving job opportunities for themselves in this country. Is the Court suggesting
that a case may arise where such a factor might be determinative of the N.L.R.B.'sjurisdiction? Further the Court seems to forget the fact that the foreign crew
in the Benz case had designated the Sailors' Union of the Pacific, one of the
defendants in the action, as its collective bargaining agent. Cf. Navios Corp. v.
National Maritime Union, supra note 12.
16. West India Fruit & S.S. Co., 47 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1961).
17. Navios Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 402 Pa. 325, 166 A.2d 625
(1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 905, 81 S. Ct. 1047 (1961).
18. The Board pointed out that it was empowered to prevent unfair labor
practices "affecting commerce" under § 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended in 1947. Under § 2(6), commerce is defined as: ". . . traffic . . .
between any foreign country and any state." "Affecting commerce" is defined by
§ 2(7) as ".... burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, as
having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce
or the free flow of commerce."
19. West India Fruit & S.S. Co., supra note 16.
The Board was speaking of the effect of the citizenship of the crew upon the
jurisdiction of the Board.
20. Id. The Board quoted favorably from Edison v. Labor Board 305 U.S.
197, 222, 59 S. Ct. 206, 214 (1938).
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Under such a broad standard as this, it could be said that every dispute
involving any ship which does sufficient business with the United States
to affect its commerce is "arguably subject" to the jurisdiction of the Board.
Surely Congress never intended to extend the provisions of the Labor
Management Relations Act to all such foreign shipping. Some language
may be found in the West India Fruit case itself which would make one
hesitate to draw such a sweeping implication. For example, the Board
stated :
Thus, the task before us, as we read the cases, is to determine
whether or not the facts in the present situation which constitute
contacts between the operation of the Sea Level [the ship involved]
and the United States are substantial - that is more than minimal
but not necessarily preponderant. The question is shortly answered,
for here we have substantial continuing American foreign commerce
and the American employer. These factors, we find, warrant appli-
cation of the Labor Act in the proceeding.21 (Emphasis added.)
Further, when speaking of some of the union's contentions, the Board
declared:
It is, nevertheless, maintained that flag law governs all and that
American ownership and commerce are not, as we have concluded,
decisive factors.22 (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted again that the ship-owner in question was a United
States' corporation. The same was true in the Navios case, 23 upon which
the court in the instant case relied, and in the other decisions which it
cited favorably.24 In the instant case, however, the court found the
broad language of the Board in West India Fruit a sufficient indication
that the dispute was, at least, "arguably subject" to the Board's juris-
diction, even though the beneficial owners of Incres were Italian share-
holders.
In trying to determine the jurisdiction of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, the intent of Congress necessarily must be the controlling
consideration. When the bill presenting the Labor Management Relations
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Navios Corp. v. National Maritime Union, supra note 17. In this case, the
primary owner of the ship in question was a Liberian corporation, which was
owned by another Liberian corporation, which, in turn, was owned by two United
State's citizens. Navios, the time charterer, was also a Liberian corporation, which
was owned by another Liberian corporation, which, in turn, was owned by the
United States Steel Corporation.
24. Afran Transport Co. v. National Maritime Union, 169 F. Supp. 416(S.D.N.Y. 1958). Here, the Liberian corporation and the Panamanian corporation
were primarily owned by "leading United States Oil and bulk carrier companies"
(at 419). Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1958). Peninsular
was a Connecticut corporation which had organized another corporation and in-
corporated it in Liberia. The ships were nominally owned by this latter corporation,
but the Board had no trouble in piercing the corporate veil to find the true owners.
[ VOL. 7
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Act was reported to the Senate it was stated that, ". . . the bill herewith
reported has been formulated as a bill of rights both for American work-
ingmen and for their employers. '25 (Emphasis added.) It was declared
further that the American workingman had been deprived of his dignity
as an individual, and it was the purpose of the bill to correct the inade-
quacy of legislation which had contributed to this condition.26 Certainly,
protection of the American workingman is needed in regard to the
policies of those ship-owners who maintain a 'flag-of-convenience' fleet.
Many American owners, by registering their vessels under a foreign flag,
effectively evade the requirement that their ships be manned with a
certain percentage of American seamen. Thus, the American seaman is
deprived of employment which would ordinarily be available to him. If we
consider this as the basic dispute in most cases involving the picketing
of 'flag-of-convenience' ships, then what must be determined in attempting
to fix the scope of the Board's jurisdiction is the presence of those factors
which would deprive an American seaman of employment he would
ordinarily receive. If the ship-owner is a citizen of the United States,
there is sound reason for finding that Congress intended to cover such a
situation, since the American workingman is most certainly adversely
affected. However, if not even the beneficial owners of a 'flag-of-
convenience' ship are American, it is difficult to see what legitimate interest
an American union has in the wages or conditions of the crew, since
there can be no claim that the under-paid foreign crew-member is filling
an American seaman's place. Of course, shipping which is essentially
foreign but which carries American products in commerce does, to a
degree, affect the United States seaman, since those shipping the goods
will tend to place their products upon those vessels which offer the lowest
freight rates, and such rates are certainly affected by the wages of the
crew. However, if all other aspects of the commerce are foreign, well-
established principles of comity should certainly outweigh this rather
indirect effect. -Therefore, without ultimate American ownership, the
union can claim little interest, even though the vessel is a 'flag-of-
convenience' ship.
In this respect, the Board in West India Fruit seemed to miss the
point of the precedents which were before it. It is generally conceded that
Congress could impose innumerable restrictions, not only upon ships
affecting commerce, but upon all ships voluntarily entering the territorial
waters of the United States.27 The vital question is whether Congress
intended to do so. As has been pointed out, traditional notions of comity
among nations regarding shipping regulations is of prime importance and
it cannot be supposed that Congress intended to sweep away all such
ideas with the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act. The
25. See, H. R. Rsp. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947).
26. Ibid.
27. See supra note 7.
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danger of enactment of similar legislation restricting United States' shipping
by the countries which would be affected must be carefully considered.
And, as has been pointed out, the fact that a vessel is a 'flag-of-
convenience' ship gives the United States' seaman no real interest in it
unless the owners are American.
It must be conceded, however, that, whatever may ultimately be
declared by the courts to be the limits of the National Labor Relations
Board's jurisdiction in this area, the language of the Board in the
West India Fruit case raises the possibility that it would claim jurisdic-
tion over the present case. Since such a possibility exists it would seem
that, in view of the Garmon case, the courts would be obliged to defer
to the primary jurisdiction of the Board. However, upon closer analysis
there arises a serious question whether the courts must await a deter-
mination by the Board in a case which involves the scope of the subject
matter covered by the federal statute itself. Admittedly, the National
Labor Relations Board is especially competent to consider whether cer-
tain acts of parties subject to the Act are unfair labor practices or
protected activities under the statute. Regarding the very scope of the
statute, however, the courts are at least equally well equipped to make
such determinations as is the Board. Questions concerning the parties
intended to be governed by the Act are not the exclusive concern of
the Board and, consequently, it would seem that the court need not be
bound by the Board's ruling in the West India Fruit case. This argu-
ment would especially commend itself in cases, such as the present one,
where the issue of coverage involves delicate international considerations
not notably within the competence of a domestic regulatory agency.
The Garmnon case, since it did not deal with the coverage of the statute,
is not contrary to such a view. Therefore, it appears not only that
Congress did not wish to bestow upon the National Labor Relations
Board jurisdiction over controversies involving shipping which is essen-
tially foreign, but also that the state court in the present instance could
justifiably have made such a determination, instead of concluding that
it was obliged to await the action of the Board. It is submitted that the
United States Supreme Court may ultimately dispose of the problem on
this basis.28
Thomas A. Hogan
0 28. The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari. Incres S.S.
Co. Ltd. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 30 U.S. L. WEK 3180 (U.S.
Dec. 4, 1961) (No. 469).
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